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1 Introduction 
The first decennium of the new constitutional dispensation introduced 
transformation in most aspects of South African society, not least on the legal 
front. This comes as no surprise as political changes by necessity influence 
both the nature and emphasis of legal systems. Thus, it was expected that after 
the static period prior to the introduction of the Constitution, contract law would 
adapt to fall into line with developments which had taken place and are taking 
place in the legal systems of our major trading partners. This paper argues that 
the cause for the stasis of contract went further and deeper than the Apartheid-
induced isolation. It finds this cause in the Westminster system and the ensuing 
legal tradition which provides a possible explanation for the reluctance to 
scupper the pre-1994 mode of adjudication. It is submitted that the drastic 
political and societal changes of the 1990s reflect a turning point in the moral 
and ethical beliefs of the nation which has been noticeable in many areas of 
the law. The core ethic of the law of contract may be identified as either the 
belief in individualism or an avowal to co-operativism. Adherence to either 
paradigm determines the acceptance or rejection of a doctrine of good faith. 
Thus, the fortunes of good faith during the last decennium are used to explain 
why the judiciary has in principle remained true to the legal tradition of the 
previous century, but by covert methods has also accommodated the new 
beliefs in social justice. 
2 Historical background 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19961 distinguishes between 
legislation, the common law and customary law.2 Furthermore, South African 
law is a mixed legal system,3 which means that as the result of historical events 
civilian jurisprudence has survived within a common-law environment.4 Lastly, 
the South African legal system is exceptional, since it is composed of both 
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1  Act 108 of 1996. 
2 S 39. 
3 Included in this group are Scotland, Quebec, Louisiana, Sri Lanka, South Africa, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and Zimbabwe. 
4 Zimmermann & Visser “Introduction” in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross: 
Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 3. 
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Western and indigenous law. The Western legal component comprises Roman 
law, Dutch law with French and Spanish influences as well as the English or 
common-law tradition.5 
The Roman-Dutch and English jurisdictions have had the greatest influence on 
the development of the law of contract. The colonisation of South Africa 
commenced in 1652 with the establishment of a refreshment station by the 
Dutch East India Company, which considered this station to fall under the 
jurisdiction of the office in Batavia. The law applicable was the law of Holland.6 
Holland had become an independent state after the Dutch revolt against the 
Spanish Habsburgs. The law applied in the Cape of Good Hope consisted of 
the general law of Holland, local statutes and customary law and, in the 
absence of these, Roman law.7 
The British occupied the Cape in 1795 and 1806 and retained this territory in 
terms of the Convention of London of 1814.8 In terms of the English common 
law, the legal status quo in the conquered territory was maintained.9 However, 
in an attempt to establish an independent judiciary,10 the Charters of Justice of 
1827 and 1832 introduced several changes to the judicial organisation of the 
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope: The Raad van Justitie was replaced by the 
Cape Supreme Court and courts of resident magistrates in accordance with the 
English system.11 Judges of the Supreme Court were chosen only from the 
ranks of the English-trained judiciary. Mercantile law and the law of procedure 
and evidence were brought within the ambit of English law as applied in 
England.12 Obviously the British-trained judges and advocates were not familiar 
with Latin or old Dutch and thus relied on translations.13 Where the Dutch 
translations did not provide an answer, the English-trained judges and 
advocates looked to English law for precedent.14 
                                                           
5 Fagan “Roman-Dutch law in its South African historical context” in Zimmermann & Visser 
(n 4) 43ff; Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System and Its Background (1973) 
570ff 580ff esp 584ff. 
6 De Wet Die Ou Skrywers in Perspektief (1988) 1ff. 
7 It is interesting to note that this application of the law in the Cape of Good Hope agreed 
with what Joannes van der Linden (tr) Juta Institutes of Holland (1891), at 1 1 4, said 
about the law to be applied in a land. 
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14 Idem 57; Hahlo & Kahn (n 8) 17ff. 
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Nevertheless, although Roman-Dutch law was maintained, the changes in the 
judicial organisation had an influence on the substantive law. This influence 
continued after formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 with the 
promulgation of the South Africa Act, 1909.15 Although a school of legal 
scholarship, in the form of the so-called purist movement, became intent on 
purifying the South African common law of English additions, an approach 
which was adopted by the Appellate Division under Chief Justice LC Steyn,16 
the South African common law today is a mixture of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century law of Holland, and parts of the English common law as 
received and developed in South Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.17 Thus, the identity of Roman-Dutch based private law was 
developed during the twentieth century: It was influenced by the rise to power 
of the Afrikaner and the notion that Roman-Dutch law symbolised the European 
cultural heritage.18 However, the determining factor for the legal tradition was 
that during most of the twentieth century law was conceived as positivistic. The 
cause for this legal positivism is to be found in the constitutional development 
of South Africa in 1910. 
3  The Constitution of the Union of South Africa 
The Constitution of the Union19 heralded modern South Africa and set its 
course until the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The South 
Africa Act, 1909, determined the route for legal development with its replication 
of a British Westminster system of government and constitution.20 In Rex v 
McChlery,21 Innes JA discussed the question whether the courts could declare 
enactments ultra vires on the ground that they are inequitable, or opposed to 
the principles of natural justice, unfair and oppressive. In response to this 
question he stated: 
 Always assuming that the restrictive limits of the empowering 
documents are observed, the discretion to judge what measures are 
conducive to peace, order and good government lies with the lawgiver 
and not with the courts. Having regard to the fact that a subordinate 
legislature is in a similar position to the British Parliament, it is 
impossible that the Colonial Courts should have an overriding authority 
to say when measures are, and when they are not, in the general 
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Part 1 ch 3 esp 89f. 
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interests of peace, order and good government. Such a task would be 
in the highest degree invidious and difficult, and it is fortunate that the 
spirit of our constitution does not impose it upon the judges. 
In the same case Chief Justice Solomon stated the principle as follows:  
 It is the Legislature and not the Courts of Law ... who are the judges of 
whether any law is required for the peace, order or good government of 
the territory under their jurisdiction ... No Court of Law is entitled to 
examine the policy of an Ordinance passed by the Legislature ... That 
is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Legislature ... All that the 
Courts of Law can do is to inquire whether the Legislature has 
exceeded the power conferred upon it … 22 
These citations indicate clearly that the Appellate Division interpreted the new 
constitutional dispensation within Austinian theory.23 Austin’s doctrine formed 
the basis of the jurisprudence of legal positivism.24 It is this paradigm that 
caused the limitation on judicial adjudication. The supremacy of an unfettered 
parliament and a judiciary functioning upon the premise of a narrowly-defined 
interpretative role constituted the foundation of the South African law prior to 
the inception of the Constitution in 1996. Thus, the most striking feature of the 
pre-1990s South African law was positivism.25 
4 Legal positivism 
Although an attempt to summarise legal positivism in a paragraph is fraught 
with hazard, the following points deserve to be mentioned: 
Positivism26 describes the law as a set of discrete rules, which are identified, 
understood and applied through the technical expertise of legal officials whose 
work is detached from the moral and political disagreements of everyday life.27 
Legal positivism provides an accurate account of law as it actually is, rather 
                                                           
22 At 226, citing Regina v Burah [1878] 3 AC 889 and Riel v Regina  [1885] 10 AC 675. 
23 Smith & Weisstub The Western Idea of Law (1983) 510-518. 
24 Hahlo & Kahn (n 5) 19 give an excellent explanation regarding the role positivism plays 
in the “anatomy” of law. 
25 Carey-Miller (n 18) 286. 
26 Jeremy Bentham A Fragment on Government (1988) provided the first philosophical 
alternative to social contractarianism. His ideas were developed further in 1832 by John 
Austin in Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Law was no longer the outcome of a 
social contract, but rather of a command. There was now a hierarchical relationship of 
power, extending up from the citizen to those in power. The source of this authority was 
customary obedience. Laws were commands from the sovereign to its subjects. Cf 
Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 341ff. Dworkin Law’s Empire 
(1986) 47 offers "law as integrity" as an alternative to positivism. The premise of “law as 
integrity” is that the point behind the rule or series of rules may be stated independently 
of the rules. Further strict rules must be understood or applied with reference to or 
extended, modified, qualified or limited by that point; cf also 87-90 135-139. 
27 Atiyah (n 26) 342. 
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than as it ought to be.28 The point of legal positivism is to commend that legal 
systems be developed in such a way as to maximise the social and political 
benefits of having a system of readily identifiable mandatory rules of such 
clarity, precision and scope that they can be routinely understood and applied 
without reference to contentious moral and political judgements.29 Legal 
positivism is thus a theory30 which recommends the creation and sustenance of 
legal systems in which laws are identified, followed and applied without 
recourse to the moral opinions of those involved in these processes.31 
Positivism negates the crucial role of judges and judicial culture in the 
ascription of meaning and significance, which in themselves are compatible 
with an infinite number of different interpretations.32 
5 Effect of legal positivism on development of the law 
Legal decisions depend on a multitude of factors not all provided in the relevant 
rules. The systematic misdescription of law as a set of determinate rules has 
the ideological function of disguising the political power of judiciaries which are 
thereby better able to impose their own values by passing off their decisions as 
the morally neutral application of pre-existing rules and encouraging the belief 
that citizens and judges alike are duty-bound to obey the objectively 
determined “law”.33 It has been maintained that legal positivism’s view on this 
point is to be found in a hidden ideological agenda, namely the legitimating of a 
system that disguises the political power of lawyers and the class interests they 
represent.34 
Therefore, many academics are of the opinion that legal positivism is a false 
and perhaps dangerous theory; that it is an historical curiosity which is 
unhelpful in relation to the development of law and legal systems.35 It has been 
held that it no longer fills the role of an official theory which can be used to 
justify the reality and importance of legal knowledge,36 and that it is not only 
false, but also pernicious as a theory which protects entrenched interests and 
renders courts less than responsive to changing needs and the well-being of 
oppressed groups in society.37 Thus it may be argued that the lack of a doctrine 
                                                           
28 Dworkin (n 26) 114-150; Campbell “The point of legal positivism” 1998 Kings College LJ 
63.  
29 Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (1979) 47; Campbell (n 28) 63. 
30 Hahlo & Kahn (n 5) 18. 
31 Campbell (n 28) 67. 
32 Hahlo & Kahn (n 5) 17ff. 
33 Campbell (n 28) 64. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Carey-Miller (n 18) 301 states as follows: ”The time warp appearance of pre-1990s South 
African law reflected its static normative basis and positivist context – both kept firmly in 
place by a controlling state. The unrepresentative system bred lawyers of legalistic 
mentality.” 
36 Campbell (n 28) 64. 
37 Gordon “New developments in legal theory” in Kairys (ed) The Politics of Law (1990) 413 
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of good faith in South African law of contract provides the perfect example of 
the effect that the Westminster system of government, positivism and the 
formalistic approach to contract law has had on this very important area of our 
law. 
6 Formalism 
A consequence of legal positivism is formalism,38 which may characterise all 
areas of legal adjudication. Formalism constitutes an attitude of mind or 
ideology of adjudication; it represents a particular view about the judicial role.39 
Atiyah explains formalism as an attitude of the judge who believes that all law 
is based on legal doctrine and principles which can be deduced from 
precedents.40 According to this view there is only one correct way of deciding a 
case. It is not the judge’s function to refer to policy considerations or consider 
the relative justice of the parties’ claims.41 The premise is that the courts are 
not concerned with the effect of a contract. All that is required is to determine 
what the contract means in order to give effect to the intention of the parties, 
and not to determine whether a just result was obtained.42 Concomitant with 
this approach is the tendency to literalism, that is, the courts' refusal to read 
into the contract anything which the parties had not expressly provided for and 
the insistence that implied terms can only be made in order to give business 
efficacy to the contract.43 
According to positivism the reason behind rules and principles is irrelevant. 
Adherence to positivism caused formalism to play a very specific role in 
contract law adjudication. Formalism infers an approach to contract law 
adjudication which is governed by a contract law regime characterised by 
individualism.44 Thus courts are denied any power or right to interfere in order 
to achieve justice. The fairness of the contract and the reasonableness of the 
                                                                                                                                                
-425, esp 420f. 
38 Horwitz “The rise of legal formalism” 1975 American J of Legal Hist 251ff. 
39 Adams & Brownsword Understanding Contract Law (2004) 41f are of the opinion that 
individualism used in the contractual sense can further be described by the adjective 
market. Market individualism is the point of departure when describing what is referred to 
as the "classical theory" of contract. In this regard cf Atiyah (n 26) at 341f and Collins 
The Law of Contract (2003) 5 35ff, who explain that these ideologies underlie the law of 
contract and play a major role in contract law adjudication. 
40 Atiyah (n 26) 389. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 In this regard see the excellent publication by Campbell, Collins & Wightman (eds) 
Implicit Dimensions of Contract (2003) in general, and especially the contributions by 
Collins “Introduction: The research agenda of implicit dimensions of contracts” 1ff, 
Campbell & Collins “Discovering the implicit dimensions of contracts” 25ff, Collins 
“Discretionary powers in contracts” 219ff, and Ireland “Recontractualising the 
corporation: Implicit contract as ideology” 255ff. 
44 Atiyah (n 26) 226ff 388ff; Adams & Brownsword (n 39) 185-204; Collins (n 39) 3-10; 
Brownsword “After investors: Interpretation, expectation and the implicit dimension of the 
‘new contextualism’” in Campbell, Collins & Wightman (n 43) 24; Pretorius “Individualism, 
collectivism and the limits of good faith” 2003 THRHR 638 639-641; Grové “Die 
kontraktereg, altruïsme, keusevryheid en die Grondwet” 2003 De Jure 134. 
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bargain do not concern the court. The parties choose their own terms and if 
one choose skilfully and the other foolishly, this is the working of the free 
market.45 
Adams and Brownsword describe contract law textbooks, treatises and 
legislation to which the judiciary refers, collectively as the rule-book.46 Formalist 
judges are governed by the proverbial rule-book.47 Although the world may 
change, the traditional rules of contract remain the same. Not only do they 
remain unchanged, but formalists view the rule-book as a closed logical 
system48 which leads to the notion that the purity and integrity of the rule-book 
must be maintained. These authors point out that formalists are distrustful of 
doctrines which deviate from the norm or allow a relaxation of the traditional 
rule.49 The formalist approach is illustrated by, for example, the abrogation of 
the doctrine of laesio enormis,50 the denial of the existence of the exceptio 
doli51 and the interpretation of the doctrine of good faith.52 
Formalism leans towards doctrinal conservatism. In consequence, formalists 
tend to avoid or limit innovations. The latter was the case with the interpretation 
of public interest in Sasfin v Beukes.53 Although it was held in this case that 
agreements inimical to the interests of the community or to social or economic 
expedience will not be enforced on the grounds of public interest, the court 
added the caveat that the power to declare a contract contrary to public policy 
should be exercised sparingly.54 In other words, if such open norms are to be 
used, they must be used with extreme caution. That this admonition was meant 
and taken very seriously becomes evident in De Beer v Keyser,55 where the 
court held that the clause in a micro-lending contract requiring borrowers to 
hand over bank cards and personal identification numbers to the lender was not 
contrary to public policy. Innovation was limited in Brisley v Drotsky where the 
question whether the non-variation clause in the contract could be found 
unenforceable in terms the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, was answered with 
                                                           
45 Horwitz (n 38) 256-257 states: “What came to be certified as purely ‘legal’, of course 
were those rules of law that had been established ... to implement a market regime.” 
46 Adams & Brownsword (n 39) 25. 
47 Adams & Brownsword (n 39) 185ff. 
48 Adams & Brownsword (n 39) 185; Atiyah (n 26) 389. 
49 Adams & Brownsword (n 39) 186. 
50 Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 1 SA 856 (A). 
51 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 616C. 
52 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
53 1989 1 SA 1 (A). 
54 Sasfin v Beukes (n 53) 9. 
55 De Beer v Keyser 2002 1 SA 827 (SCA); Hawthorne “Public policy and micro-lending – 
has the unruly horse died?” 2003 THRHR 116. 
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the statement that a court could not shelter in the shadow of the Constitution in 
order to attack and set aside principles.56 
Since formalism exhorts judges to base themselves on well-established rules in 
“the rule-book”, they are of necessity reluctant to employ open norms such as 
good faith, public policy and boni mores.57 In Brisley v Drotsky the Supreme 
Court of Appeal by majority found that good faith is not an independent free-
floating basis for setting aside or not enforcing contractual principles.58 The 
court laid down that good faith does not constitute a legal rule.59 Furthermore, it 
was held that courts have no discretion but to enforce contract clauses subject 
to crystallised rules of the law of contract60 and that a court could not act on 
abstract ideas.61 For judges, working within the ambit of formalism, sympathy 
and politics cannot be material considerations unless the “rule-book” makes 
them essential. Positivism and formalism demand a nearly mechanical 
application of rules and doctrines. Phrases such as freedom of contract and 
sanctity of contract are used without critical reflection of their purpose or the 
social context within which they are to be applied.62 Consequently, formalism 
supports the application of clear general rules which require no judicial 
discretion. In Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat63 the court upheld an agreement 
entered into by the father of a severely injured minor and an attorney 
specialising in road accident claims. The attorney had debited the financial 
award made to the injured minor with an exorbitant untaxed fee, thus failing to 
maximise the disabled minor’s financial ability to negotiate his economic future. 
It was held that the existence of the constitutional community had not given the 
                                                           
56 Brisley v Drotsky (n 52) 16D-E. 
57 Hawthorne “Closing of the open norms” 2004 THRHR 294; cf also Hopkins “Standard-
form contracts and the evolving idea of private law justice” 2003 TSAR 150; Naudé 
“Exemption clauses – A rethink occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom” 2004 
SALJ 442; Lewis “Fairness in South African contract law” 2003 SALJ 330; Lubbe “Taking 
fundamental rights seriously: The Bill of Rights and its implications for the development of 
contract law” 2004 SALJ 395. 
58 (n 52) at 15E; the court relied on a statement made by Hutchison in “Non-variation 
clauses in contract: Any escape from the Shifren straightjacket” 2001 SALJ  720. 
59 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) 41A-B. 
60 Such as mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, the rules against contracts 
in restraint of trade, application of the in pari delicto rule, the judge’s discretion to reduce 
a contractual penalty in terms of s 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act 15 of 1962, and by 
providing for the relaxation of the principle of reciprocity and the award of a reduced 
contract price where equity demands it, when applying the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus. 
61 Brisley v Drotsky (n 52) 1A-B. 
62 Cf Adams & Brownsword (n 39) 186 who hold that: “Formalism takes the idea that 'justice 
is blind' quite literally: the rule book is to be applied blind to any consideration of the 
merits of the case, the purpose or point of the rules, or the context of the dispute.” 
63 2001 1 SA 464 (C); for a case discussion see Du Plessis “Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 
2001 1 SA 464 (C)” in 2002 De Jure 385ff. 
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concept of good faith enough content to trump sanctity of contract64 and the 
agreement was enforced. 
Moreover, formalists prefer a rule which either allows or disallows a clause over 
one which allows a clause subject to the condition that it satisfies the 
requirement of good faith. This becomes clear in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom,65 where a patient had signed a standard hospital contract containing 
an exclusion of liability clause which prevented him from instituting a claim 
against the hospital if he suffered damage as a result of the hospital's 
negligence. There was no evidence to show that the respondent had occupied 
a weaker bargaining position than the hospital during the conclusion of the 
contract. The court held that good faith was not available to ameliorate the 
contract.66 
Formalist judges believe that it is not their function to make contracts,67 but only 
to apply rules. The definitive question when a case comes up on appeal is not 
whether the trial judge obtained the correct result, but whether the correct rules 
were applied. This was clearly exemplified in the provincial division decision in 
Strydom v Afrox68 where Mavundla AJ found that High Courts could depart 
from pre-constitutional decisions of the Appellate Division (as it then was) when 
exercising their powers in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution. This 
section provides: "[W]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” The honourable judge thus 
came to the conclusion that the common-law rule that a contractual term 
contrary to public interest is unenforceable must be interpreted in the light of 
the Bill of Rights.69 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the 
                                                           
64 At 475G-J and 476F-J. This decision was taken regardless of the fact that the court made 
reference to the excellent article on the topic by Neels “Die aanvullende en beperkende 
werking van redelikheid en billikheid in die kontraktereg” in 1999 TSAR at 700 as well as 
to the criterion adhered to by Zimmermann in his chapter on “Good faith and equity” in 
Zimmermann & Visser (n 4) 259f, ie a minimum level of respect for each other’s interest, 
where an unreasonable and one-sided promotion of one’s interests at the expense of the 
other would outweigh the sanctity of contract and empower the court to refuse 
enforcement. 
65 (n 59) 21. 
66 Idem at 40G-J 41A-B. 
67 Hawthorne “Distribution of wealth, the dependency theory and the law of contract” 2006 
THRHR 48 at 49ff. 
68 2001 4 All SA 618 (T). In this case it was found that an exclusion of liability clause in a 
private hospital’s admission contract, which also constituted a contract of adhesion, was 
unenforceable. The honourable judge relied on ss 27(1) and 39(2) of the Constitution, 
holding that the common-law rule that a contractual term contrary to public interest is 
unenforceable must be interpreted in the light of the Bill of Rights and the plaintiff's 
constitutional right to access to health care services. The High Court argued that the right 
to health care services entitled the claimant to have access to health care services 
provided in a professional manner with reasonable care. The indemnity clause protected 
the respondent against claims for negligence and thus curtailed the plaintiff’s right to 
professional health care. On the basis that the plaintiff was denied this constitutional right, 
the High Court found the indemnity clause unenforceable. 
69 At 627. 
80   Legal tradition and the transformation of orthodox contract theory 
_______________________________________________________________ 
High Courts, when developing the common law in terms of section 39(2), are 
bound by all pre-constitutional Appellate Division decisions. Mavundla AJ in the 
court a quo had failed to apply the right rule, but had obtained a cooperatively-
orientated result in opposition to classical market individualism, where self-
reliance is the ruling ethic. It was the doctrine of stare decisis which prompted 
the Supreme Court of Appeal to come to this decision.70 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal relied on Govender v Minister of Safety and Security,71 in which 
decision the Constitutional Court also embraced the tenets of formalism in 
regard to the application of the doctrine of stare decisis. In this regard the court 
held: 
 High Courts are obliged to follow legal interpretations of the SCA, 
whether they relate to constitutional issues or to other issues, and 
remain so obliged unless and until the SCA itself decides otherwise or 
[the Constitutional] Court does so in respect of a constitutional issue.72 
7 Realism 
Legal realism departed from the premise that the law is out of touch with 
reality.73 Its battle cry was contained in a statement made by Justice Holmes 
that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience”.74 Realism 
challenged the orthodox claim that legal thought was separate and 
autonomous from moral and political discourse. The realist critique was 
directed at the orthodox classical contract theory which justified the unequal 
results of the self-executing market economy as being just and equitable 
because they reflected the unequal abilities that the individuals brought to the 
market. The orthodox theory still holds that any attempt at interventionism in 
order to achieve social justice by results subverts the legitimacy of the market 
process which is considered to be a neutral, apolitical arbiter of the fair and 
reasonable distribution of wealth.75 The realists argued that the notion that the 
market constituted a system of free and voluntary exchange which reflected the 
                                                           
70 Cf Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (n 59) 40C-E where reference is made to Hahlo & 
Kahn (n 5) 224. 
71 2001 4 SA 273 (SCA), [2001] 11 BCLR 1197 (CC), 2001 2 SACR 197 (SCA). 
72 At 646F-I. 
73 Horwitz The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crises of Legal Orthodoxy 
(1992) ch 6 187. According to the author (at 169) “legal realism” refers to a school of 
thought represented mostly by law professors at Columbia and Yale Law Schools during 
the 1920s and 1930s. The great names are Karl Llewellyn and Robert Lee Hale at 
Columbia and Walter Wheeler Cook and Arthur Corbin at Yale. 
74 The Common Law (1881) 1: “The life of the law has not been logic, it has been 
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories; 
intentions of public policy avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges 
share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in 
determining the rules by which men should be governed.” 
75 Horwitz (n 73) 194; Atiyah (n 26) 321ff. 
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results of a neutral market was fallacious.76 Thus Cardozo stated “that the 
judge is under a duty, within the limits of his power of innovation, to maintain a 
relation between law and morals, between the precepts of jurisprudence and 
those of reason and good conscience”.77 He attacked positivism and warned 
against its logical outcome: “The constant insistence that morality and justice 
are not law, has tended to breed distrust and contempt of law as something to 
which morality and justice are not merely alien, but hostile.”78 The realist legacy 
is to be found in their emphasis of contextualising contractual adjudication in 
order to ground the law and to bring it into touch with reality. The realists have 
added a new dimension to the discourse by insisting that law should reflect and 
express a more complex social reality: law needs to mirror social relations.79 
The above explains that a formalist judicial approach stands in sharp contrast 
to that of realist judges who are today identified as being of consumer welfarist 
persuasion.80 The fact that the market does not produce fair results was first 
noticed and remedied by the legislature. Thus, the notion of welfarism81 is 
particularly reflected in legislative interventionism.82 However, Brownsword 
describes how, in England and elsewhere, welfarist protection has gone 
beyond legislation.83 He cites the conceptualisation of equitable estoppel, the 
doctrine of economic duress, the right to withdraw for breach of contract, and 
the recognition of consumer disappointment as a loss fit to be compensated by 
awards of damages as examples of this judicial activism.84 This interventionism 
promotes fairness and reasonableness. A realist approach to adjudication 
emphasises the facts and the decision of a case rather than the rules.85 Being 
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83 Adams & Brownsword (n 39) 178. 
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82   Legal tradition and the transformation of orthodox contract theory 
_______________________________________________________________ 
result orientated, realism supports innovation of doctrines and concepts. On 
occasion, the South African judiciary has also displayed strong realist 
tendencies. An important example in this regard is the decision in Tuckers 
Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis.86 In this case, Jansen JA 
held that there should be a duty on a promissor not to commit an anticipatory 
breach of contract, and that it is accepted that an anticipatory breach 
constituted by the violation of an obligation ex lege flows from the requirement 
of good faith which underlies the law of contract.87 A further example of realist 
adjudication is the honourable Justice Van Zyl’s extension of the aedilitian 
remedies to the seller in a trade-in agreement,88 in circumstances where the 
trade-in vehicle had a latent defect, or an innocent but incorrect dictum et 
promissum had been made in respect of that vehicle. The learned judge based 
this extension on the basis that the principles of justice, equity, reasonableness 
and good faith are all norms inherent in the law of contract.89 The court found 
justification for this bold step in the constitutional imperative that courts are to 
apply or to develop the common law where it does not give effect to the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights.90 Equality being one of these rights, Van Zyl 
recognised equity as a principle in the law of contract. Another decision in line 
with realist precepts was delivered in the Cape Provincial Division in Miller and 
Another NNO v Dannecker91 when the honourable Justice Ntzebeza found that 
a court may refuse to enforce an entrenchment clause should this result in a 
breach of the principle of good faith. In the earlier mentioned provincial decision 
of Strydom v Afrox,92 Mavundla AJ found that High Courts could depart from 
pre-constitutional decisions of the Appellate Division (as it was then) when 
exercising their powers in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution. The 
learned judge found that the common-law rule in terms of which a contractual 
term contrary to public interest is unenforceable should be interpreted in the 
light of the Bill of Rights.93 These decisions exemplify realist adjudication and 
are buds of realism grafted on the rootstock of the Constitution in opposition to 
the colonial legacy of formalism. 
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8 Constitutionalisation of the law 
Formalism departs from the premise that law reform is the responsibility of 
Parliament and not the courtroom. On the one hand, the adoption of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 199494 should have constituted a 
fundamental break with a formalistic approach to contract law.95 On the other 
hand, positivism ought to compel adjudication in accordance with the rule-book, 
the rule-book in this instance being the Constitution. The advent of the 
Constitution should have signalled, as Mureinik advocated, a shift from a 
culture of authority to a culture of justification.96 Formalism should have given 
way to realism where the emphasis is to be found in the result rather than the 
mechanical application of the rule.97 Thus henceforth, the exercise of all public 
power ought to be justified in terms of democratic norms and values.98 The 
mere invocation of authority for the proposition that something has been 
established by previous case law should no longer be decisive since all law 
and conduct are subject to the demand for public justification.99 In Baloro v 
University of Bophuthatswana,100 Judge President Friedman identified the 
difficulties associated with applying stare decisis to constitutional litigation: 
 The Courts in South Africa are now confronted by a rapid oscillation 
from the positivist jurisprudence founded on the sovereignty of 
Parliament to a jurisprudence based on the sovereignty of the law 
contained in the Constitution with a justiciable bill of rights. 
Consequently, all law is now subject to the supremacy of the Constitution. We 
are in the unique situation that although our legal system is not codified, our 
Constitution instructs as to how the law should be developed and 
interpreted.101 All law, including common law, must be interpreted and 
developed to give effect to constitutional rights and values. South African law 
has taken a giant step forward with the achievement of constitutional 
supremacy and a justiciable Bill of Rights. In 1996, section 8(2) of the 
Constitution gave the Bill of Rights horizontal application. Furthermore, section 
39(2) instructs the courts to interpret legislation and to develop the common 
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law and customary law in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the 
same Bill. Thus, the foundations are laid for an equitable development of the 
law of contract. 
In essence the Constitution calls for a reappraisal of traditional ideas of the 
judicial function and of legal interpretation. It requires judges to engage in 
substantive legal reasoning, to articulate the values upon which their decisions 
are based and to engage with the social, historical and legislative context.102 
Judges themselves are thus made subject to the demand for justification: 
rather than simply relying on a pre-existing rule or precedent, they are required 
to engage in value-based, contextual reasoning.103 
Consequently, the new constitutional dispensation promises to initiate new 
developments in the law of contract. Despite rhetorical support for good faith, 
fairness and reasonableness, however, the post-constitutional pattern in our 
case law remains a succession of victories for the free marketeers. It would 
appear that the heritage of positivism and formalism has effectively jeopardised 
development of the law of contract by means of constitutional interpretation. 
Judge Cameron of the Supreme Court of Appeal, in Brisley v Drotsky,104 
provides the following explanation for this situation: On the one hand the 
common law of contract is subject to the supreme law of the Constitution,105 
while on the other hand the Constitution enshrines the fundamental values of 
human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism.106 This requires a balance 
between contractual freedom and “securing a framework within which the 
ability to contract enhances rather than diminishes our self-respect and 
dignity”.107 Cameron AJA found further that the Supreme Court of Appeal has 
shown perceptive restraint in respect of freedom of contract despite the 
constitutional requirement that the courts, when developing the common law, 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.108 This has been 
possible as a result of the fact that the Constitution contains a variety of values 
which may in certain instances conflict. The chasm between equality and 
freedom is very evident in the law of contract, while human dignity is open for 
many interpretations. Although Cameron AJA held that it is not difficult to 
envisage situations in which contracts, which offend the fundamentals of our 
new social compact, will be struck down as being offensive to public policy,109 
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such situations have failed to materialise. The Supreme Court of Appeal has 
reservations regarding over-hasty or unreflective importation of boni mores into 
the field of contract law. It is also of the opinion that neither the Constitution nor 
the value system it embodies gives the courts a general jurisdiction to 
invalidate contracts on the basis of judicially perceived notions of unjustness, or 
to determine their enforceability on the basis of imprecise notions of good 
faith.110 
9 Resistance to constitutionalisation based on the 
doctrine of stare decisis 
In Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters111 the 
Constitutional Court held that the High Courts must follow the interpretations of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal with regard to the interpretation of all forms of 
law. The High Courts are so obliged unless and until the Supreme Court of 
Appeal decides otherwise, or the Constitutional Court does so in respect of a 
Constitutional question.112 In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom it was found that 
High Courts, when attempting to develop the common law or interpret 
legislation in accordance with the dictates of section 39(2) of the Constitution, 
are also bound by the decisions of higher tribunals given before the new 
constitutional era.113 In effect, these two cases hold that the High Courts have 
very little constitutional jurisdiction. 
Section 39 (2) of the Constitution clearly exhorts development of the common 
law in accordance with the spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights. The 
Constitution itself is meant to be a measuring stick for settled areas of law. It is 
difficult to believe that the Constitution, which was meant to herald a new social 
order, precludes all courts, with the exception of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and the Constitutional Court, from redressing past and present wrongs. Such 
an interpretation would imply that the drafters of the Constitution had enshrined 
pre-democratic, apartheid era values in our law. This would perpetuate the old 
tradition of authority when there should have been a change to a culture of 
justification.114 
Woolman and Brand115 have provided solutions to this conundrum in their 
excellent, thought-provoking and enlightened essay. These authors plead for a 
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softened doctrine of stare decisis since constitutional adjudication is heavily 
laden with prevailing values which change rapidly, especially in a 
heterogeneous society which has moved to a democracy within a very short 
space of time.116 After Afrox and Walters, the High Courts at present appear to 
have little opportunity to develop the common law as required by section 39(2) 
of the Constitution. 
10 Conclusion 
The Eurocentric nature of the South African common law has cast some doubt 
over its prospects of survival under the new constitutional dispensation. The 
view of Justice Albie Sachs that our Eurocentric rules have become Africanised 
has prevailed: 
 Shorn of their associations with domination, there is no reason why 
these institutions should not be taken over and infused with a new spirit 
so as to serve the people as a whole rather than just a minority.117 
Whether contract law adjudication has upheld these sentiments is debatable. 
When the dictum of Cameron AJA in Brisley v Drotsky – where the learned 
judge chooses clearly in favour of freedom in the eternal tension between 
freedom and equality – is viewed in the context of Schauers’ observation that 
the nature of appellate adjudication influences the entire legal system, the 
answer may be negative. However, in view of the force of our legal tradition, 
the fact that small steps in a realist direction have been made should not be 
underrated but rather commended. 
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